By: Aaron Wang

Time-lapse footage has become ubiquitous, and one common one is of a bridge rising where none existed yesterday. It can be startling, and that is exactly what the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is doing. China’s new amphibious jack-up barges, often called Shuiqiao or “water bridge” in mandarin (水桥) aim to do just that across a beach, turning surf and mud into a drivable pier for tanks and trucks. As amphibious assault ships and vehicles, manufactured by COMEC (CSSC Offshore & Marine Engineering (Group) Company Limited), they radically alter the military calculus that the Taiwanese military (Republic of China Armed Forces (ROCAF)) faces. 

The Barges

Picture three boxy barges arriving offshore. Each lowers spindly legs to the seabed to stabilize in waves. A folding truss bridge then swings out from the lead barge, similar to an oversized Bailey bridge, until it touches the shoreline. Then, several similar barges will link together into several sets, creating a temporary causeway from deeper water to the beach. Recent satellite imagery suggests spans of a few hundred feet each, with units observed in build at Guangzhou Shipyard and trialed off China’s south coast in early 2025.

Implications

Amphibious assaults are not only critical to initial military landings, but also critical to the logistics that follow an invasion or landing. To Chinese military planners, ports are obvious targets and prime landing points. Meanwhile, some beaches could be suitable for landing but some may be narrow chokepoints with strong tides and soft mud. Chinese military planners know that Taiwanese miltiary planners also know this. Therefore, PLA landings at any obvious landing points (i.e ports, exposed and wide beaches) would meet heavy resistance. 

A mobile pier changes that math. By letting roll-on, roll-off ferries unload heavy armor directly onto coastal roads without a functioning port. That widens the potential selection of landing sites and complicates a defender’s preplanned kill zones. The concept echoes the Allies’ Mulberry harbors at Normandy, adapted for the Taiwan Strait. As a result, Taiwanese planners may have to stretch troops thin and identify other potential landing sites that can accomodate barges. However, the very reason why its complex is that the barges can land virtually anywhere. 

The Puzzle Pieces

These barges are not first-wave assault craft. They are tools that arrive after an initial attack and surrise strike, which would most likely be characterized by missiles, aircraft, helicopters, special-ops, sabotage, drones, espionage, and massive cyberattacks. But once an area is suppressed and a footprint secured, the barges jack down, bridge out, and begin allowing heavy armoured vehicles ashore en masse, potentially at less obvious beaches. 

Sightings

Multiple sets of amphibious jack-up barges have been photographed at Guangzhou Shipyard, with assembly timelines that run from late 2024 into early 2025. The repetition across images suggests serial production rather than a one-off prototype, implying mass producton. Hull sections, truss segments, and the distinctive jack-up legs appear in different stages of completion, which points to a maturing build process inside the yard.

By March 2025, imagery and short video showed three barges working together off China’s south coast, including near Nansan and Zhanjiang. The clips capture coordinated maneuvering, the lowering of the support legs, and partial bridge deployments toward the shoreline. For observers, this is important because it moves the concept from drawings to at-sea trials where sea state, current, and crew choreography begin to matter.

Design details are visible even at moderate resolution. Each unit carries jack-up legs to pin the platform to the seabed for stability. The bow holds an extendable truss bridge that folds for transit and then swings forward during setup. The geometry appears sized to meet roll-on, roll-off ramps, which makes it easier for civilian ferries or military transports to offload heavy vehicles directly onto the temporary pier.

Advantages for the PLA

The primary advantage is flexibility. Traditional amphibious planning concentrates on a short list of beaches and intact ports. A modular and mobile pier reduces that dependency and opens more coastline for potential use. Even if only a few sets operate for a day or two, they can move meaningful tonnage of vehicles, ammunition, fuel, and engineering gear across the surf zone and onto coastal roads that would otherwise be harder to land.

Stability in the near-shore environment is another strength. Floating causeways tend to heave, yaw, and flex in currents, which makes sustained heavy traffic risky. Jack-up legs, however, change the physics by transferring loads into the seabed and reducing motion at the deck. A steadier platform allows for continuous roll-on, roll-off operations and reduces downtime while the sea is unsettled. Additionally, the modular structure helps decrease the rigidity somewhat, allowing for the barge to absorb more force from shear forces and torque.

There is also a civil-military synergy at play. China operates a large fleet of roll-on, roll-off ferries with ramps and decks that are well suited to vehicle throughput. Thus, the barges function as the shoreline adapter that connects deep-draft ships to the beach, exemplifying this “dual-use” character. This pairing increases daily throughput without waiting for a functioning port and shortens the time from arrival offshore to useful combat power ashore.

Weak points defenders can target

Setup time is the most obvious vulnerability. Lowering legs, checking footing, swinging the bridge, and aligning with landing craft or ferries takes minutes to hours, not seconds. During that window the system is identifiable in location and profile thanks to modern satellite imaging and intelligence sharing. Anything that is stationary within range of coastal missiles, artillery, uncrewed surface vessels, or loitering munitions becomes a priority target and can be attacked repeatedly. However, that is assuming that a decapitating strike that the PLA would certainly inflict had failed to eliminate all of Taiwan’s defense. 

Environmental limits are a second weakness. Taiwan’s west coast is known for strong tides, soft mudflats, and seasonal storms. If the seabed does not provide sufficient bearing strength, the legs can sink or tilt and the pier becomes unsafe. If waves exceed operating limits, vehicle flow pauses or stops. In a contested environment, even short weather gaps can be exploited by the defender to strike the immobilized structure. Other areas exhibit cliffs, which potentially limit the effectiveness of the barge.

A third weakness is the sustainment chain itself. The barges matter only if they keep the conveyor running from ship to shore. A defender can allow a small disruption to form, then cut the pier and the ships that feed it. Destroying bridge spans, damaging leg mechanisms, or cratering the beach access road can starve the beachhead. Without steady resupply, the initial landing force becomes easier to isolate and defeat.

What to watch next

Production scale will tell the story. If multiple sets are completed and staged in peacetime bases within quick reach of likely landing sectors, the concept is meant for real operations rather than demonstration. Pre-positioning fuel, spare truss segments, and repair kits would further indicate a plan to keep the piers working under fire and weather.

Integrated exercises are the next marker. Watch for drills that pair the barges with roll-on, roll-off ferries and large amphibious ships, complete with helicopter cover, minesweeping, and coastal suppression. Complex training would show that planners are working to reduce setup time, refine choreography, and practice recovering from damage while keeping vehicles moving ashore.

Finally, look for counter-pier doctrine, which is under development, from Taipei. More sea mines, longer-range coastal fires, swarming autonomous surface craft, and faster targeting cycles would show a focus on the threat of snap amphibious landings. Investments in rapid damage assessment and re-attack would also signal an intent to keep the pier closed even if it is repaired between strikes. 

In the end, the situation in the strait is volatile and dynamic. Statecraft can mislead information distribution and the general public about intentions. But always look towards the facts of what is being developed and what is happening.